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China’s coercive activities in the South China Sea have resulted in a lively 
academic debate regarding strategies to deter Beijing and maintain the status quo. 
However, much of this literature has been dominated by the U.S.–China dynamic 
and has neglected the vital role of the littoral states in the region. This article, 
through the lens of a maritime strategic environment, deals with the potential for the 
littoral nations of the South China Sea to deter China. It argues that conventional 
deterrence by denial is a difficult but applicable strategy despite the substantial 
power asymmetry that exists between China and the littoral states in the region. 
However, such a deterrent approach must be tailored to the specific, non-existential 
challenges that China poses in the region. Among these challenges, this article 
examines deterrence within the context of China’s claim to the Spratly Islands and 
expansive claims to economic exploitation rights. A maritime strategic environment 
provides multiple avenues to impose cost on a superior power and the littoral states 
in the region have invested heavily in naval capabilities. However, as this article 
finds, it remains to be seen if the littoral states in the region have the technical 
capability or political will to successfully enact such a deterrent strategy. 
Keywords: South China Sea, conventional deterrence, naval strategy, maritime 
security, Spratly Islands
Introduction
How to deter China’s seemingly inexorable drive to dominate the South China Sea (SCS) 
is a question that has gained substantial traction in policy and academic circles.1 This 
debate is largely dominated by the U.S.–China dynamic and is often framed within the 
broader question of who will be the future hegemonic power in East Asia. Consequently, 
although they are central protagonists, an analytical deficit exists regarding the capacity 
of the littoral states of the SCS to protect their own interests against the multi–faceted 
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coercive challenge posed by China.2 These states are pursuing substantial naval 
armament programs largely driven by China’s increasing maritime presence. However, 
there has been little analysis as to the deterrent effect of such build-ups considering the 
nature of the threats China poses.
In addressing this gap, this article argues that the maritime strategic characteristics 
of the SCS are a substantial and hitherto under-explored factor in determining both how 
China challenges the status quo in the region and the efficacy of conventional deterrent 
responses to these challenges. China presents an interconnected economic, operational 
and strategic threat to the littoral nations of the region. Beijing not only contests control 
of the Spratly Islands but also undermines the free and fair use of the sea by using its 
growing maritime power to further its perceived economic and strategic interests. The 
operational realities of this maritime strategic environment provide the littoral states 
of the SCS with the ability to offset some of China’s power advantage but also reduce 
the effectiveness of conventional deterrence to meet the multitude of quasi–military 
challenges a recalcitrant China presents.
This study proceeds in six parts. The first demonstrates how the unique features of 
a maritime strategic environment inform the nature of China’s operations in the SCS. 
The second part describes how conventional deterrence at sea under conditions of power 
asymmetry functions while the third highlights the potential power offsets that maritime 
geography and naval capabilities could provide the weaker nations in the region. The 
fourth part examines the role of third parties such as the United States in confronting 
China and the failure of such actors to deter China’s actions. The fifth and sixth parts 
investigate the potential for asymmetric conventional deterrence in the specific contexts 
of the Spratly Islands and maritime resource exploitation. The article ends with some 
concluding observations. 
The Sea Shapes the Threat 
The maritime strategic geography of the SCS shapes China’s application of its increasing 
military and economic power by constraining Beijing’s ability to pose an existential 
threat to the region while at the same time providing China with multiple unique avenues 
to undermine the existing status quo and further its political, strategic and economic 
objectives.
In the SCS, maritime strategic geography inhibits any potential desire on China’s 
part to pose an existential threat to nations of the region.3 The stopping power of water 
ensures that large–scale attacks from the sea on to land are extremely difficult and not 
only require military capabilities, which China does not yet possess, but also fortuitous 
geostrategic circumstances.4 This reality differentiates the SCS from a continental 
theater, where a superior bordering power consistently poses a potential existential threat 
as the Soviet Union did on the borders of Western Europe during the Cold War.
Although China cannot currently pose an existential threat from the sea, it does 
present a complex challenge on it. Beijing is exploiting the strategic, political and legal 
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characteristics of the sea to employ a gradual coercive strategy, operationalized by 
military, para–military and civilian actors, to reach a number of strategic and economic 
goals.5 Driven by an increasing awareness of and political emphasis on securing its 
perceived maritime interests, China is seeking to implement its vision of a new status 
quo for the SCS.6 One where it can extract the sea’s resources, beyond the rights granted 
by UNCLOS, to the detriment of littoral nations and at the same time gain strategic 
preeminence in this vital geostrategic region.7 
China’s operational approach to the SCS is founded on the tracklessness of a 
maritime strategic environment. The sea is largely uncontrolled and ungoverned. 
In littoral areas, sovereign boundaries as defined by UNCLOS, including territorial 
waters, contiguous zones and EEZ are not demarcated by geographical or man–made 
features nor are they normally protected by the continuous presence of navies or civilian 
maritime law enforcement agencies.8 Instead, such boundaries are created by political 
and legal agreements made on land and maintained by a normative acceptance of 
such boundaries by all parties combined with a credible ability to enforce sovereign, 
economic or navigation rights. Consequently, at sea, there are no border fences or 
crossings to be defended. State and non-state maritime actors who do not agree with, or 
choose to ignore, the status quo, can easily contest the integrity of such boundaries by 
entering and exiting contested territory to assert temporary control, deny control, claim 
ownership or exploit resources. 
China’s status quo–altering approach is embodied in the ambiguous nine–dash 
line which encompasses 90 percent of the SCS and ostensibly represents China’s 
claim of sovereignty over this maritime region. While China’s claims have no basis in 
international law, having been declared illegitimate following the 2016 SCS Arbitration, 
the lack of enforcement mechanisms and the nature of operations at sea allow Chinese 
state and non-state actors to press such claims despite them not being recognized by the 
littoral states of the region. The nine–dash line includes the contested features of the 
Spratly and Paracel Islands. China, Vietnam and Taiwan claim all the Spratly Islands, the 
Philippines claims 53 features and Malaysia claims 12.9 
On land, operationalizing such claims would require the crossing of hard borders 
by a state actor and would be legitimately construed as a belligerent act. At sea, as 
permanent control is nebulous, the relationship between maritime territory and outright 
belligerency is more opaque. In contested or strategic waters, the total control of the sea 
over extended periods is a near impossible task as opponents will attempt to deny such 
control or exploit the size of the sea to operate unimpeded in different areas. Instead, 
control is more often impermanent and localized. This leaves much of the sea un-
commanded and allows parties with sufficient capabilities to temporarily impose their 
will without contest.10
These characteristics allow Chinese state and non-state actors to exploit the 
multibillion–dollar aquaculture and energy potential in the region in violation of 
established international norms. The ability to easily enter and exit areas, in and 
proximate to foreign sovereign waters, permits China to continuously contest maritime 
boundaries and ostensibly establish a new status quo, where Chinese economic and 
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strategic interests and interpretations of maritime law are impressed on the region’s 
weaker littoral powers. At the same time, by building up its naval and maritime law 
enforcement presence, China can use coercive pressure to influence the littoral nations 
and potentially control the vital SLOC which run through the region. Consequently, 
states such as Singapore, which are not in direct territorial or economic dispute with 
Beijing are potentially threatened by this new reality as they have a vested interest in 
maintaining maritime stability.
Asymmetric Deterrence at Sea
As maritime strategic geography shapes the nature of China’s operations in the SCS, 
it equally plays a role in determining the efficacy of conventional deterrence strategies 
designed to meet these threats. Deterrence is a strategy designed to prevent one party 
from performing an unwanted action by reducing the benefits or heightening the 
potential costs of said action.11 
In a paradigm where there is power parity, or the deterring party has superiority, 
a naval force will ideally develop a deterrence strategy which contains elements of 
both punishment and denial.12 This is the standard assumption on which naval analysts 
espouse the unique capacity of seapower to implement conventional deterrence.13 The 
forward-deployed and based U.S. Navy is the most powerful naval force in the world 
and thus has the capacity to employ both elements. It maintains assets which can “impose 
unacceptable consequences on an aggressor” and “deny an adversary the physical or 
psychological benefits of its aggression.”14 
However, in a maritime theater such as the SCS where the weaker side is the 
deterring party, the power imbalance limits the available deterrent options. Deterrence 
by punishment functions on the threat of retaliation if an opponent undertakes aggressive 
action.15 It is the fear of these costs which deters unwanted action. The ability to 
operationalize deterrence by punishment is dependent on the possession of credible 
capabilities sufficient to hurt an aggressor.16 Under conditions of power asymmetry, 
punitive conventional naval capabilities that could sufficiently punish a larger power 
are beyond the capacity of smaller navies. The pursuit of such an approach is not only 
inefficient but is inherently risky under conditions of power asymmetry as it could 
provoke the larger power into pre-emptive action.
Consequently, a weaker navy’s preferred deterrence option is deterrence by denial. 
Deterrence by denial concentrates on the prevention of an aggressor meeting its 
immediate goals.17 This is enacted by “convincing an adversary that it cannot achieve its 
objectives rapidly or convincingly” thereby preventing a fait accomplis and reducing the 
benefits of aggression.18 Naval forces can be deployed to increase the uncertainties and 
heighten the potential costs to an aggressor even if said military forces could not mount 
an effective defense.19 In this case a deterrent capacity may be demonstrated in actual 
operations, when deterrence initially fails but the defensive act, even if unsuccessful, 
imposes sufficient costs to deter repeat occurrences or further action.20 
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Despite their relative weakness, smaller navies can impose a denial strategy as 
described above. Small navies are strategically and operationally relevant when pitted 
against a more powerful opponent.21 This is particularly true in littoral waters where 
navies can leverage geography and technology to punch above their weight and impose 
substantial cost on an attacking force.22 Under such conditions, victory in battle does 
not have to be the primary objective; instead the smaller force can maintain capabilities 
which can alter an opponent’s perception regarding the advantages of aggression.23 
Therefore, the smaller naval force can make aggression prohibitively costly at an 
operational level or can prolong a conflict in the hope of garnering international 
assistance or sympathy, thereby raising the cost on a political level.24
Credibility, Geography and Capabilities
Although, the weaker powers of the SCS may attempt to enact a deterrence by denial 
strategy, China’s sheer power advantage calls into question the credibility of any such 
deterrent strategy. However, in the strategic maritime environment of the SCS where the 
nature of the conflict is, as described above, limited, coercive and non-existential, power 
asymmetry can be mitigated during everyday operations. 
Credibility is at the heart of deterrence; an aggressor must be convinced that an 
opponent is capable and willing to carry out a deterrent strategy.25 Mearsheimer, in 
addressing conventional deterrence on land writes that “where asymmetry is so great that 
the attacker does not have the slightest doubt that he will succeed on the battlefield...the 
concept of conventional deterrence does not apply.”26 The power differential suggests 
that at sea such a premise may also ring true and that the littoral nations of the SCS 
cannot credibly deter China’s actions in the region.
However, China’s maritime geostrategic position and the nature of operations at sea serve 
to partially offset its numerical superiority in everyday operations. This is relevant, as in cases 
of deterrence, it is not the ratio of total capabilities but the “immediate and short–term balance 
of forces” in proximity to the target that has the most impact on deterrence calculations.27 As 
the UK discovered during the Falkland invasion, despite the possession of nuclear weapons 
and a relatively powerful military capability in Europe, if there are no forces to credibly 
impose cost at the point of attack, deterrence is more likely to fail.28 
That China possesses a vast superiority in terms of naval and civilian platforms is 
not in doubt. Table 1 demonstrates China’s significant numerical advantage in terms of 
deployable naval platforms, while Table 2 highlights the scope of Beijing’s policy to 
bolster the capacities of its maritime law enforcement agencies to the disadvantage of the 
other claimant states. Further, China also uses a state–supported civilian maritime militia 
operating from its massive fishing fleet to further increase its presence in the region.29 
China’s superior production capacity ensures that it is almost certain to maintain its 
advantage in ships. Between 2016 and 2017, China added 15 1500+ ton vessels and over 
100 vessels between 250 and 1500 tons to its maritime law enforcement agency fleets 
while in the same period the nations of the SCS added on three vessels over 1500 tons.30
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China is, however, unlikely to concentrate the entirety of its maritime forces in one 
theater. With a coastline of over 14,500 kilometers, China has a long littoral and large 
maritime interests to defend. The United States, Japan and South Korea maintain 
substantial naval forces on its eastern flank and Beijing is in an ongoing dispute in the 
East China Sea with Tokyo over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands.31 Additionally, China’s 
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Table 1. List of current naval vessels operated by littoral states in the SCS.
Table 2. List of civilian law enforcement vessels operated by littoral states in the SCS.
China 71* 206* 246*
Brunei 0 0 10
Indonesia 2 9 128
Malaysia 2 0 218*
Philippines 0 7 54
Singapore 0 0 102
Taiwan 9 14 137
Vietnam 7 15 56
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( ) represent figures for China’s South Sea Fleet.
* represents approximate figures.
Source: IISS, “Chapter 6: Asia,” The Military Balance 2017 (2017), 237–350.
* represents approximate figures.
Source: IISS, “Chapter 6: Asia,” The Military Balance 2017 (2017), 237–350.
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increasing global interests require more vessels to be deployed away from littoral 
waters. These facts serve to reduce China’s numerical superiority in both naval and 
maritime law enforcement platforms over the littoral nations of the SCS who have fewer 
maritime interests and smaller territories to manage. Further, as Cable notes, a sustained 
deployment of a vessel at distance requires a ratio of three to one, further diluting 
China’s quantitative advantage.32 Table 1 demonstrates that taking the China’s South 
Sea Fleet in isolation substantially reduces the Chinese advantage in terms of platform 
numbers.
The size of the SCS at approximately 3.5 million square kilometers further mitigates 
China’s power superiority. China’s claimed areas of sovereignty cover 90 percent of the 
theater, posing a problem regarding the dispersal of naval assets. The Spratly Islands are 
over 520 kilometers from Hainan naval base, the longest distance for any of the claimant 
states. While the construction of facilities on Woody Island and island–building on the 
Spratly Islands can reduce the burden of distance by turning previously insignificant 
features into air bases and ports for basing and resupply, they do not completely alleviate 
the numerical leveling that geography and strategic requirements impose.
Conventional Capabilities at Sea
Under conditions of asymmetry, modern naval capabilities can further contribute to the 
effective employment of a credible deterrent strategy. The proliferation of increasingly 
inexpensive but still high-end off-the-shelf naval systems has allowed for a substantial 
and ongoing naval rearmament program in the SCS, which has increasingly been driven 
and influenced by the threat China poses.33 The region’s militaries are now able to deploy 
surveillance and defensive capabilities which can have an out-sized operational impact 
in relation to their investment. However, the sustainable and effective deployment of 
such capabilities to enact a deterrent strategy at sea will remain a challenge for the 
resource–limited navies in the region.
For smaller navies, the capacity for the early detection of potentially hostile forces in 
their area of operations is vital for the efficient and quick deployment of resources and 
is a requirement for an effective asymmetric deterrent strategy. Modern, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities can create an environment where 
concealment at sea is increasingly difficult.34 In the SCS, there is a pronounced interest 
in the procurement of ISR capabilities, including coastal and air defense surveillance 
systems from a multitude of foreign suppliers. Indonesia has recently deployed three 
modern Cn-235MPA maritime patrol aircraft which are equipped with hard points for 
anti-ship missiles or torpedoes and foreign sensors.35 Vietnam has procured six DHC 
Twin Otter aircraft and the Philippines is bolstering its maritime surveillance capability 
by availing of Japanese capacity–building in the form of TC-90 patrol aircraft and the 
purchase of two modern long–range surveillance planes.36 
Table 3 shows that since 2000, navies across the SCS have looked to replace and 
upgrade their surface and subsurface capabilities. While domestic shipyards feature 
more heavily in the construction of these vessels, there is a continued reliance on foreign 
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suppliers for weapon and sensor systems. None of the navies possess the capacity to 
undertake offensive operations against a superior force like the PLAN but are seemingly 
pursuing a somewhat balanced fleet structure capable of undertaking a multitude of 
missions.37
NAME TYPE DISPLACEMENT NEW/REPLACE
Brunei 4 Darussalam OPV 1625 New
Indonesia 4 Makassar
6 Martadinata
4 Diponegoro
16 Clurit
3 Changbago
LPD
Frigate
Corvette
FAC
Submarine
8400
2365
1692
250
1400
New
Replace
New
New
New
Malaysia 6 SGPV
6 Kedah Class
2 Scorpene
Frigate
Corvette
Submarine
3100
1850
1870
New
Replace
New
Philippines 2 Tarlac
3 Hamilton
3 Balikpapan
LPD
Frigate
LCH
11,583
3250
517
New
New
New
Singapore 8 Independence4 Type 218
6 Formidable
4 Endurance
OPV
Submarine
Frigate
LPD
1200
2000
3530
8500
Replace
Replace
New
New
Taiwan 4 Kee Lung
1 Cheng Kung
1 La Fayette
12 Tuo Chiang
30+ Kuang Hua VI
Destroyer
Frigate
Frigate
Corvette
Missile Boat
7289
4169
3600
567
171
New
New
New
New
New
Vietnam 6 Gepard
8 Molniya
6 Kilo
Frigate
Corvette
Submarine
1930
540
3950
New
New
New
Table 3. Major naval platforms deployed or confirmed for procurement since 2000.
Source: IISS, “Chapter 6: Asia,” The Military Balance 2017 (2017), 237–350; and SIPRI, Arms 
Transfer Database.
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Notably, the procurement of modern naval capabilities has significantly strengthened 
the surface warfare potential of these navies. At sea, small numbers of modern anti-ship 
(AShM) can impose significant cost on an enemy force. At short ranges they are difficult 
to intercept and require quick and effective hard and soft kill measures to be stopped.38 
As they can be launched from the surface, subsurface, air and land, these weapons can 
alter the cost calculation of any offensive operation as even for large navies platforms 
are limited assets which are difficult and costly to replace.39 As Table 4 indicates, except 
for the Philippines, the navies of the region currently, or will, deploy modern Russian or 
NATO–origin anti-ship missiles, including the latest version of Exocet, the Norwegian 
Naval Strike Missile, KH-35 and Klub missiles. Between 2006 and 2016, the number of 
deployable AShM missiles on Vietnamese vessels has risen by almost 400 percent from 
56 to 216. Indonesia has doubled its capability over the same period from 80 to 160 with 
a similar emphasis on fielding modern weapons. Additionally, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore are deploying advanced surface-to-air missiles on their platforms, providing 
them with a much needed short and medium–range defensive and air denial capability. 
This is a noticeable gap in the Vietnamese navy’s capabilities, which was created when 
an order for Dutch–built Sigma class frigates fell through.
Name Range Operator Number Origin
Anti-Ship Missiles (Surface)
Harpoon 67 nm+ Singapore/Taiwan 185 US
Naval Strike Missile 100 nm+ Malaysia 100 Norway
Otomat 97 nm Malaysia 24 Itaiy
C-802 64 nm Indonesia License China
C-705 75 nm Indonesia License China
Exocet Block 3 97 nm+ Malaysia/Brunei 60 France
Exocet Block 2 38 nm Indonesia 70 France
SS-N-25 70 nm Vietnam 400 Russia
Anti-Ship Missiles (Coastal)
SS-N-26 65–162 nm Vietnam 40 Russia
Hsuing Feng-II ? Taiwan ? Taiwan
Anti-Air Missiles
Mistral 6 km Indonesia 160 France
MICA 20 km Indonesia/Malaysia/Singapore 190+ France
Seawolf 10 km Malaysia 31 UK
Aster-15 30 km+ Singapore 300 France
Aster-30 120 km+ Singapore 200 France
Standard-1MR 74-167 km Taiwan 204 USA
Standard-2MR 74-167 km Taiwan 292 USA
SA-19 8 km Vietnam 200 Russia
Table 4. Naval missile systems introduced since 2000.
Source: IISS, “Chapter 6: Asia,” The Military Balance 2017 (2017), 237–350; and SIPRI, Arms 
Transfer Database.
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Despite the formidable denial capability that shore–based anti-ship missiles provide, 
only Taiwan and Vietnam currently deploy them. The former possesses an unknown 
number of Hsuing Feng II missile systems, which are deployed to hinder any potential 
Chinese invasion. Vietnam has procured 40 missiles for the Russian made K-300P 
Bastion-P coastal defense system. This portable long–range system gives Vietnam an 
effective sea–denial capacity within its littoral zone.
The pursuit of submarines has featured prominently in the commentary regarding 
the build-up of naval forces in the SCS. Modern diesel submarines, while expensive 
and complex, are a powerful force multiplier. They have the capacity to cut off sea lanes 
or interdict attacking surface vessels at distance from their objective.40 Importantly, 
if operated efficiently, they substantially increase the strategic and tactical reach of 
a smaller navy extending the operational range beyond the littoral.41 These qualities 
explain the substantial expenditure that the SCS has witnessed in recent years. Vietnam 
is adding six Kilo class diesel submarines while Indonesia is procuring three Chang 
bogo submarines from South Korea. The latter will initially complement the Indonesian 
Navy’s two Type 209 submarines; however, both vessels are reaching the end of their 
useful service life. Malaysia operates two French–built Scorpene submarines while 
Singapore is seeking to maintain a fleet of four vessels with four German Type 218SG 
being procured to replace their existing fleet. 
Aircraft procurement in the region reveals a mixed picture with small numbers 
of new aircraft being procured from foreign suppliers. Airpower is a vital tool in 
contested waters, particularly in small sea spaces or in the littoral where naval forces are 
particularly vulnerable to airpower.42 In the short term, even small numbers of aircraft 
can deny an opponent the secure use of the sea by imposing significant costs on their 
operations.43 Malaysia and Vietnam are investing in formidable strike aircraft with 
the former operating eight U.S.–made F-18D and 18 Russian SU30 MKM multi–role 
fighters and the latter purchasing over 40 SU-30MMK to supplement its aging fleet of 
SU22 aircraft. Singapore operates a powerful mix of 40 American–built F-15 and 60 
F-16 multi-role fighters. Indonesia now operates a combination of Russian and U.S. 
fighters and has selected the long–range and capable SU-35 to further bolster its fleet.44 
The Philippines, however, is severely deficient in aircraft. Taiwan operates a significant 
number of F-16 and Mirage 2000 but must focus on the threat of invasion from China 
rather than the SCS.45
Taking this procurement at face value the navies of the SCS are developing a 
capacity to enact a credible deterrent strategy. However, despite the build-up of 
capabilities, the pursuit of such a strategy under conditions of asymmetry does present 
many challenges. The sustained deployment of subsurface, surface and air assets, which 
can respond to events at sea, presents formidable economic, maintenance, training and 
command control difficulties. To effectively utilize modern naval systems, these navies 
must develop advanced C2 capabilities often across services. Such capabilities take time 
to develop and integrate into existing systems and organizations.46 While some littoral 
nations of the SCS, such as Singapore, have successfully pursued such integration, it 
remains to be seen how effective such efforts will be across the region.
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Further, smaller forces often struggle to create a “critical mass” of operational 
platforms that can sustain a state of operational readiness while also keeping to 
maintenance and training cycles.47 For resource limited forces, naval and air capabilities 
are expensive and represent large proportions of defense capital expenditure. It takes 
considerable time to procure and then optimally integrate new platforms into existing 
fleets. The chief of the Malaysian Navy recently noted that possessing many different 
platforms and systems was a burden on budgets.48 Consequently, the Malaysian Navy 
will reduce its number of ship classes from fifteen to five, thereby freeing resources for 
the effective operation of existing and future platforms. 
This burden could become a factor in the Indonesian and Vietnamese navies and air 
forces, which now operate large numbers of vessels and aircraft of different types and 
origin. This not only challenges budgets but also operational efficiency and training. It is 
no surprise that the Singaporean Navy is regarded as one of the most competent in Asia, 
given its consistent procurement plans and small number of ship classes. 
The time needed to develop an effective deterrence posture at sea exposes smaller 
navies to a fundamental dilemma that arises from a deterrent strategy. For any form 
of conventional deterrence to succeed, the deterrer is required to communicate its 
capabilities.49 This is not a risk–free strategy, as effective communication of capabilities 
gives time for an aggressor to respond.50 This suggests a degree of fluidity to a deterrent 
relationship, where strategy, tactics and capabilities must be continuously adjusted to 
the threat posed. This provides an advantage to resource–superior navies as they have a 
greater capacity to design around specific deterrent capabilities. 
Submarine operations encapsulate many of these issues. The littoral navies of the 
SCS have invested substantial sums into submarine procurement. They are perceived as 
being force multipliers whose inherent stealth make them optimal deterrent platforms. 
However, submarines are complex machines that are expensive to operate and maintain. 
For small navies with limited budgets, the choice to pursue such a capability may open 
a Pandora’s box of financial, manning and operational challenges over the long term, 
many of which the navies of the SCS have yet to overcome.51 Further, for submarines to 
optimally deter, they would have to advertise their capabilities and deployment patterns, 
thereby reducing the strategic benefits of their inherent stealth.52 Larger navies often 
possess the capability to design around such threats or use critical mass to overwhelm 
a smaller submarine force. In the Falklands conflict, the Royal Navy was not deterred 
by the presence of Argentinean submarines.53 Instead the Royal Navy committed 
resources and altered tactics to operate around the threat. Chinese reactions to Vietnam’s 
submarine capacity suggest a confidence that they can deal with such a capability arising 
from their ability to develop anti-submarine capabilities which could neutralize a sub-
surface threat.54
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Deterrence and the Third–Party Offset
The littoral nations of the SCS are vulnerable to the coercive potential of China’s 
developing maritime power. Growing maritime capabilities provide governments with 
the potential to pursue foreign policy goals at increasing distances from land.55 In the 
case of China, the naval and maritime capabilities that they have developed allow 
them to enact a series of policies which may conform with domestic Chinese law and 
interests but violate international agreements and states’ rights in the SCS. However, the 
geostrategic reality of operating at sea ensures that the littoral states of the region do not 
necessarily have to face such challenges alone and may gain support from international 
actors with economic or strategic interests in the region. Such international involvement 
may further offset the asymmetric position in which the littoral powers of the region 
find themselves and many states in the region have looked to foreign partners to balance 
China’s presence with varying but often disappointing levels of success.
The fact that the sea is a global commons and vital medium for economic activity 
adds a strategic element not normally found in continental theaters.56 The sea draws 
non-contiguous third parties, who may not be directly threatened but have economic or 
strategic interest in contested waters. Collective security actions such as the international 
anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden or individual efforts such as U.S. tanker 
escort operations in the Middle East during the Iran–Iraq War demonstrate how the 
sea pulls states towards distant seas when their security or economic interests are 
threatened. In the SCS, the littoral states of the region can leverage the economic and 
strategic importance of the region to draw in external powers to deter the detrimental 
consequences of China’s operationalization of its maritime claims.57 
The deterrent effect of third parties is, however, uncertain within the context of 
the challenges posed by China to the littoral nations of the SCS. The U.S. Navy is the 
most active third party in the SCS and it views the region as fundamental to its strategic 
interest. Yet its consistent presence in the SCS has failed to deter China from land 
reclamation on the Spratly Islands. Further as the United States does not take a position 
on the legitimacy of contested claims, and instead advocates adherence to international 
laws and norms, Washington has largely been unwilling to involve itself in the vital 
resource exploitation conflicts that characterize much of China’s challenge to the littoral 
states of the region.
Freedom of Navigation operations do contest Chinese interpretation of navigation 
rights and may underline the United States’ commitment to deterring China from 
preventing legitimate activity in the region. However, it is uncertain how stable such 
a deterrent effect is. The impact of such signaling and coercive operations is difficult 
to gauge, as the utility of coercive naval diplomacy has most likely reduced as target 
societies become more advanced, weapons technology more diffuse and the use of force 
less acceptable.58 Given that the sea is trackless, the U.S. Navy cannot maintain forces 
in every location, allowing China’s large naval and maritime law enforcement presence 
to impose its will on the littoral nations of the SCS. Essentially, the U.S.’ deterrent effect 
is transitory given the size of the maritime theater and the scope of China’s challenges 
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which allow Beijing to selectively operationalize its policy preferences in the region.
The one exception is the case of the Philippines—the sole state in the SCS formally 
allied with the United States—which seems to have benefitted from the alliance to deter 
Chinese encroachment on their territory. There is evidence that in April 2016 the United 
States deterred China from artificially altering the Scarborough shoal by deploying 
additional air and sea assets in the region.59 However, for the Philippines, this approach 
is not ideal; as analysts have highlighted, the U.S. commitment to the defense of the 
islands is not guaranteed despite the existence of a defense treaty.60 
Beyond the United States, the international reaction to China’s actions has largely 
been confined to pleas for adherence to international law. States such as Japan, Australia, 
India and the United Kingdom have focused on emphasizing international norms and 
limited capacity building, but have not deployed forces to the region beyond those 
carrying out port visits and exercises. Naval diplomacy often produces a political 
signaling effect, but as of yet, such actions have failed to deter or alter China’s actions 
in the region as most states are unwilling to employ credible measures to support the 
international order
Despite these weaknesses, the littoral states in the region have persisted in drawing 
in outside support. Singapore is a good example of a state that has embraced the United 
States as a security partner to act as a counter-weight to China in the region. Singapore 
does not contest waters or islands with China and does not fear invasion or even direct 
military conflict with Beijing. Over seventy percent of its population is ethnically 
Chinese. Yet, its strategic concern arises from the potential for Chinese domination 
of the maritime sphere on which Singapore is reliant for its economic and strategic 
security. Singapore has sought to enable the U.S. presence in the region and emphasize 
its strategic importance to Washington without being burdened with a formal alliance. 
Singapore has allowed four U.S. Littoral Combat Ships to be deployed on a rotational 
basis from Changi naval base, while in 2016, the United States committed to using 
Singapore as an occasional place of deployment for its maritime surveillance aircraft. 
They also constructed docking facilities capable of hosting a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier. 
Other countries in the region have modeled this approach albeit to different extents. 
Vietnam has embraced increased maritime engagement with the United States and 
other external parties, notably Japan and India.61 This has taken the form of naval and 
coast guard exercises, capacity building and providing access to the deep–water port 
at Cam Ranh Bay.62 It is also a beneficiary of U.S. aid, receiving capacity building 
assistance, most notably in the form of 18 U.S.–made patrol boats for the coast guard. 
Hanoi’s security relationship with Tokyo has also matured, with over 15 high-level 
defense meetings occurring between 2011 and 2014. Japan donated six used coast 
guard vessels to the Vietnamese maritime police in 2014. However, Vietnam is wary of 
antagonizing China and the benefits of a U.S. presence, for example, may not explicitly 
strengthen deterrence within the context of the challenges China poses.63 This logic can 
be extended to Indonesia which has long pursued an independent defense and security 
policy. In 2015, it upgraded or improved its defense and security relationships with the 
United States and Japan. These ties provide the opportunity for technical assistance, 
Ian Bowers564
procurement and some operational coordination. However, they are limited in their 
impact on Indonesia’s immediate challenge around the Natuna Islands. 
Deterrence and the Spratly Islands
China’s superior maritime capabilities imply that features in the SCS held by opposing 
parties are vulnerable should China commit to taking them by force. As the Paracel 
Islands are now firmly under Chinese control, it is the Spratly Island Chain which is 
now the epicenter of the deterrent challenge where the claimant states must maintain 
their holdings in in the face of Chinese power. Absent third party support, the role of 
the claimant states’ military forces is to alter China’s calculations regarding the benefits 
of such action by ensuring that any effort would result in a high political or physical 
cost. Although the maritime strategic environment provides the weaker powers with the 
ability to partially offset their inferiority, ultimately any deterrent strategy is reliant on 
Beijing’s unwillingness to accept such costs in relation to the potential gains of offensive 
action. 
The build-up of military capabilities in the SCS suggests that such a strategy 
is being pursued by many of the claimant states. China’s distance from the islands 
ensures that their naval forces must run a potential gauntlet of opposing capabilities 
to both take and resupply their features in the region. Southeast Asian investment in 
surface, subsurface and air launched AShM provides the capacity to narrow the areas 
through which Chinese forces could travel safely.64 This reality provides the littoral 
states of the SCS with the ability to both implement sea denial operations and make 
any attempt to hold territory extremely difficult. However, despite the continued 
development of this capability, an open question exists regarding the willingness 
of the claimant states to continue a conflict after China has accomplished a fait 
accomplis given the potential economic, political and military costs such a conflict 
would entail. While the sea provides an offset against China’s maritime power, 
deterrence requires the willingness of the littoral states to utilize their military 
strength in this non-existential context.
Therefore, the prevention of a fait accomplis is of primary importance in this 
maritime strategic environment. This explains the weaker claimants’ primary deterrent 
approach which is to ensure that any Chinese effort to take disputed features would 
involve displacing forces in-situ. The need to engage with opposing, weaker forces with 
the prospect of casualties in a non-existential matter raises the potential political cost for 
Beijing. China’s takeover of Mischief Reef and the Scarborough Shoal occurred in part 
due to the Philippines’ inability to maintain the permanent presence required to enforce 
its claim.65 Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan and Malaysia have now all implemented 
a sustained manning approach, placing forces on permanent features such as islands, 
platforms and in the case of the Philippines, grounded vessels. These forces, often lightly 
armed, and stationed on small outcrops or platforms, are vulnerable should Beijing 
wish to undertake offensive action, but are essential to both maintain sovereignty over 
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existing holdings and ensuring that no Chinese action would be cost–free. 
These states have also sought to reinforce their positions on many features. Added 
defensive measures are aimed at imposing some physical cost on any Chinese action, 
no matter how successful it may be. There is evidence, however, that some states are 
reluctant to heavily reinforce their holdings to avoid an escalation of tensions with 
Beijing, indicating that China’s political and economic power has a detrimental effect on 
their deterrent capacity.
Vietnam has stationed naval infantry across its holdings in the Spratly Islands. It has 
also deployed 14 Dk-1 platforms on a number of shallow banks and has undertaken its 
own limited island augmentation program.66 It has constructed a runway on the Spratly 
Islands and is augmenting its defensive features on at least four islands and reefs that it 
controls.67 U.S. officials have indicated that Vietnam maintains weapons systems, such 
as the Israeli–made extra rocket artillery system on these facilities.68 Malaysia maintains 
five naval stations on its significant features—the largest on Swallow Reef has a runway 
for both military and civilian use. It is reported that the Malaysian garrisons in the region 
are equipped with fast patrol craft, artillery and anti-air systems.69 
Similarly, Taiwan maintains a substantial garrison on Itu Aba. This is manned by 
the Taiwanese Coast Guard supported by the Taiwan Marine Corps.70 Facilities on 
this island have also undergone upgrades, with the runway being repaired and the pier 
modified to take larger 3000–ton coast guard vessels.71 There is evidence of weaponry on 
the island and the coast guard has been given six 155 millimeter howitzers which could 
be deployed to the island in case of emergency.72 However, Taiwan seems reluctant to 
permanently deploy such capabilities lest it raises tensions with China or other claimant 
nations.73 The Philippines is in the weakest position, stationing forces on a grounded 
vessel near the Second Thomas shoal, and garrisons on a small number of islands. Its 
largest facility is on Thitu Island which has a runway, a small civilian population and 
limited defenses.74 While it has committed to modernizing these facilities, there is little 
evidence this is occurring and in the current period of detente between Manila and 
Beijing, the Philippines appears reluctant to risk China’s ire and economic good will by 
altering the status of its forces in the region.75
Deterrence and Economic Exploitation
The role of conventional deterrence in managing China’s economic activities in the SCS 
is even more problematic than the case of the Spratly Islands. Conventional deterrence 
as enacted by military actors has limited utility in this context where contestation of 
rights is often more important when, absent a political or legal solution, there is little 
hope of deterring China. Nevertheless, the littoral nations of the SCS are investing in 
maritime law enforcement capabilities and are increasingly using military capabilities to 
support these agencies.
China’s relative power superiority ensures that the littoral nations of the region 
cannot bring coercive strategies or political leverage to bear to prevent China from 
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operationalizing its expansive economic claims. The resort to legal mechanisms, as 
demonstrated by the Philippines arbitration in 2016, has had little effect on the ground, 
as currently, China refuses to recognize the authority of such decisions and there are no 
mechanisms for enforcement.
Chinese fishing fleets have been found consistently operating in the EEZ of 
neighboring states thereby implicitly pressing Beijing’s maritime claims,76 notably in 
the case of Indonesia around the waters of the Natuna Islands, and Malaysia around the 
Luconia and James shoals. China’s state–owned energy concerns have also performed 
survey operations in contested areas. Chinese coast guard and militia vessels have 
interfered with and detained foreign vessels undertaking legitimate economic activities 
such as oil exploration and fishing.77 The same agencies also support Chinese economic 
activity, protecting HD-981 during its controversial deployment. While China’s civilian 
maritime forces and fishing fleets take the lead, they are supported by the Chinese 
military.78 During the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012, the PLAN provided planning 
support to the Coast Guard and during the HD-981 incident the PLAN provided “over 
watch” support.79
Aspects of conventional deterrent strategies to prevent illegal resource exploitation 
have functioned in the past. The fishing wars between Canada and Spain, Brazil and 
France and the United Kingdom and Iceland all saw military and civilian maritime law 
enforcement assets being deployed to protect maritime interests in contested areas.80 In 
all three cases, the use of such assets raised the political and physical cost of pressing 
such claims and political solutions were subsequently found.
There is, however, little evidence that the employment of robust military or maritime 
law enforcement measures have successfully deterred Chinese state and non-state actors 
from economic exploitation operations in the SCS. Strategies to deter illegal Chinese 
economic activity or Chinese–state support of such activity have largely failed, as 
Beijing does not recognize the illegality of its activities and does little to prevent its large 
fishing fleet or state energy concerns from operating in contested waters. 
Some states in the region, notably Indonesia and Malaysia, have employed robust 
“sink the boat” initiatives where vessels caught in the process of illegal fishing are seized 
and then destroyed, pour encourages les autres.81 However, there is little evidence that 
such action has discouraged Chinese large–scale economic activity in contested waters. 
This reality, where Beijing seems willing to ignore the political cost of supporting 
illegal economic activity has been replicated in the East China Sea. The presence of the 
JMSDF and Japanese Coast Guard have failed to deter illegal Chinese economic activity 
in contested waters particularly around the Senkaku/Diaoyudao islands. Large–scale 
intrusions of Chinese fishing vessels escorted by the Chinese Coast Guard have occurred 
in these waters despite the presence of Japanese vessels.
The one exception has been illegal Chinese fishing around the strategically important 
Han River estuary off the west coast of the Korean Peninsula. In this case, Chinese 
vessels were operating in an area controlled by the United Nations Command Military 
Armistice Committee and were likely in violation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. 
South Korean police boats flying both the UN and South Korean flags began operating 
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in the area and interdicted, expelled and captured several Chinese–flagged vessels. 
Importantly, they provided evidence to the Chinese government of such illegal actions 
as South Korea recognized that “to fundamentally resolve the issue of illegal fishing 
by Chinese boats, China’s own law enforcement efforts were needed to stop them from 
entering ROK territorial waters.”82 The active enforcement of international law and the 
involvement of the UN raised the political cost for Beijing and forced China to prevent 
further illegal economic activity. However, in other cases in waters surrounding the 
Korean Peninsula, illegal Chinese fishing activity persists despite robust efforts on the 
part of the Korean Coast Guard and Navy to prevent and deter it.
This does not imply however, that deterrence in the SCS has no role. The presence 
of naval and coast guard capabilities has a potential conventional deterrent function 
in preventing China from using excessive force in impressing its state and non-state 
economic interests. Indonesia, for example, has reinforced its capabilities on the Natuna 
Islands to better combat China’s intrusions in the vital economic areas nearby. This is 
reported to include the bolstering of the islands’ air defenses and surveillance capability, 
improving runway facilities, developing docks for larger surface and sub-surface assets, 
and increasing the number of military personnel from 800 to 2000.83 Indonesia has 
also responded to the state/non-state element of China’s encroachment in its waters. In 
2016, Chinese Coast Guard ships forced an Indonesian vessel to return a seized Chinese 
trawler. Consequently, the TNI-AL has deployed larger vessels thereby raising the cost 
of Chinese Coast Guard interference and going as far as firing warning shots at Chinese–
flagged vessels operating around the Natuna Islands.
Beyond deterring the use of force, the littoral states of the SCS need to maintain a 
sustained presence and continue the assertion of authority within their claimed borders. 
Vietnam’s actions during the deployment of the HD 981 are a good example of this 
strategy. It was unable to stop such a deployment without the use of undue escalatory 
force, but by contesting its presence, Vietnam sustained its own claim to the region and 
highlighted Chinese violations. This strategy partially explains the build-up in coast 
guards in the region, with notable increases in tonnage and capabilities. Vietnam is in the 
process of introducing several new vessels, including fast patrol boats, 2000–ton patrol 
boats and a replenishment oiler to sustain coast guard vessels at sea.84 Taiwan introduced 
two 3000–ton vessels in 2015 while the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Authority is 
procuring six new 297–ton patrol craft which will also be equipped with UAV.85 
Despite this build-up of capabilities, China’s increasing political, economic and 
military power will continue to pose substantial difficulties for the littoral states of the 
SCS. Vietnam’s 2017 suspension of oil exploration activities in the SCS was attributed 
to China’s threat to use force against Vietnamese installations in the region.86 This 
purported unwillingness to risk conflict with China over resource exploitation has 
substantial negative implications for deterrence. By indicating that maintaining resource 
exploitation rights at sea was not worth the potential cost of conflict with China, 
Vietnam’s deterrent credibility was undermined. While the littoral states of the SCS may 
be able to contest China’s presence in contested waters, without sufficient political will 
they may struggle to ensure their own ability to exploit the sea’s resources. 
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Conclusion
This article has argued that the maritime strategic environment both determines the 
conditions in which China challenges the status quo and affects how conventional 
deterrence is applied. Despite substantial power asymmetry, deterrence by denial is in 
part an applicable strategy for the littoral nations of the region. However, conventional 
deterrence under these conditions is unstable and uncertain as it relies on China being 
unwilling to accept cost in pursuit of its policy goals. If deterrence is to function, the 
littoral states of the region are required to also accept risk and impose cost on China. 
However, despite the build-up of substantial military capabilities, core questions remain 
regarding their willingness to use force and risk the potential political, military and 
economic backlash from China over what are non-existential issues. This is particularly 
true in the case of maritime economic exploitation rights where conventional deterrence 
has a limited, but still important, utility. Contesting violations of sovereign territory may 
be the best option in this scenario, but sufficient capabilities must be credibly deployed 
to deter China from using excessive force. 
The SCS will likely remain a melting pot of conflicting geostrategic interests and the 
potential deterrent strategies of the littoral states of the region should not be discounted 
as important elements in ensuring that stability can be maintained. However, even 
with effective deterrent strategies, China is unlikely to alter its overall approach to 
the region and will continue to undermine the status quo. The nature of the maritime 
environment ensures that a long–term solution would require a political compromise 
on land most likely reinforced by the threat of punishment against China. The littoral 
nations of the SCS are not able to take such action, but as this article has determined, 
third parties, including the United States, have so far proved unwilling to fully engage 
with the strategic dilemmas China is posing in the SCS. The deterrent approaches of the 
littoral nations in the region would further benefit from consistent third–party assistance 
in dealing with China’s actions. However, research is required on understanding the 
economic, political and military modes and consequences of such third–party actions. 
The SCS is a complex geostrategic maritime environment, and if stability is to be 
maintained, it will ultimately require nuanced responses, including deterrence tailored to 
the individual challenges China’s rise poses on the seas of Southeast Asia.
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